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Window Dressing in
Reported Earnings
By Liming Guan, Steven Daoping He and John Mc Eldowney
Can seemingly small rounding manipulations inﬂuence
ﬁnancial statement users’ perception of credit quality?

F

rom an accounting perspective, the term
engage in this type of manipulative behavior.
“window dressing” refers to a wide range of
One incentive relates to perceptions of earnings
techniques that an audit client might use to
figures as key cognitive reference points in the
enhance the ﬁnancial position of an entity through
eyes of financial statement users. For example,
manipulated disclosures. For the purposes of this
general sales practice holds that pricing a prod
article, the term will be more strictly deﬁned. Winuct at $1.99 encourages consumers to view a
dow dressing, as used in
product at this price to
this article, refers to the
be significantly cheaper
reporting practices adthan one marked, say,
opted by some ﬁ rms to The incentive to report rounded earnings $2.00. Science theorizes
intentionally distort earnthat this perceptual dis
to meet the requirements of debt
ings and the statement
continuity is most likely
covenants is a particularly important issue caused
by the way the
of position by chang
in the lending industry.
ing the way the ﬁnancial
human brain perceives
figures are perceived by
numeric data. In essence,
the brain tends to store
stakeholders. This occurs
what it perceives to be the most relevant bits of
when a stakeholder is presented with a manipu
information about a number (or the price of a
lated earnings ﬁgure that is marginally greater
product as in the previous illustration). In the
than the actual value. For example, if a ﬁ rm’s
eyes of a consumer, a price of $698 is more likely
income for the year is $5.99 million, management
to be perceived to be “six hundred and some
may fraudulently increase the reported earnings
thing” rather than “almost seven hundred.” This
ﬁgure to one that is slightly above $6.0 million.
is because the process of rounding up is a more
Because of the way the human brain processes how
complex process for the human brain than that
numbers are perceived, this practice has a strong
of rounding down.2 Extrapolating this concept to
tendency to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions
concerning the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm. Stakeholders
may perceive a more favorable ﬁnancial position
Liming Guan is an Associate Professor in the School of Accountancy at
than is warranted under the circumstances. While
the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii. Contact him at
the fraudulent alteration of the reported amounts
lguan@hawaii.edu.
can be relatively immaterial, the impact on users’
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perceptions can be substantial. As found by the
ing and Finance at San Jose State University, San Jose, California. Contact
authors, such rounding behavior is a common
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practice in companies both in the United States
1
and around the world.
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two primary economic incentives for firms to
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the financial markets can help explain the incen
tive management might have in manipulating
the reported earnings of a firm. From a financial
statement perspective, earnings of $598,000 may
be perceived by investors to be much lower than
$600,000. There would be a distinct tendency for
stakeholders to view the earnings as “five hun
dred and some thousand” rather than “nearly six
hundred thousand.” Knowing that marginally
modified earnings figures could change an in
vestor’s perception of a firm’s future earnings, it
would be in management’s best interest to round
up financial totals whenever possible to positively
influence the behavior of stakeholders.
A second incentive for management to round up
various ﬁnancial ﬁgures relates to the use of con
tracts. Contracts dealing with lending agreements,
compensation contracts related to budgets, etc.,
normally tend to be created using ex ante estimates.
In practice, these contracts tend to be based on
rough ﬁgures that emphasize the ﬁrst digit in the
contractual ﬁgure. Because of this, small changes
in the contractual parameters may have large cash
ﬂow effects.3 Ironically, this practice has come to
be known as “earnings management.”
The process of rounding up reported ﬁnancial
ﬁgures for a company normally won’t be challenged by the ﬁrm’s external auditors because it
is likely to be viewed as “immaterial.”4 However,
such practice obviously impairs the quality of
reporting for the company’s ﬁnancial statements.
This impairment is evidenced by comments by
Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a speech
delivered at New York University, he warned that
earnings management by corporate America was
signiﬁcantly eroding the quality of the ﬁnancial
reporting process.
The incentive to report rounded earnings to
meet the requirements of debt covenants is a
particularly important issue in the lending in
dustry. Lenders, by necessity, are concerned not
only with a borrower’s operating and financial
risks but also with the representational faithful
ness of the borrower’s financial statements. The
prevalence of earnings manipulation creates a
significant risk burden on the lending industry.
In addition, this incentive to marginally increase
financial totals to meet contractual agreements
MAY–JUNE 2008

may not be homogeneous for firms in different
industries. Therefore, in forming day-to-day lend
ing decisions, lenders would also be interested in
evidence of the extent of earnings manipulation
across industry groups.
The purpose of this article is to use digital analy
sis based on Benford’s Law to investigate and
compare the extent of window dressing (that is,
reporting rounded earnings) among U.S. firms in
a number of specified industries. The existence of
these practices within the various firm categories
and their homogeneity across these industries are
also addressed.

Benford’s Law
and Digital Analysis
Benford demonstrated that the expected distribu
tions of naturally occurring numbers are skewed
toward the number one for the leading digit in a
multidigit number and toward the number zero
in the second position of a number.5 This law, also
known as the ﬁrst-digit law, maintains that for
many diverse types of numerically based data,
the number one occurs more than 30 percent of
the time as the ﬁrst digit in a multidigit number.
Ancillary to this axiom is that the larger the digit
is, the less chance it has of being in the ﬁrst posi
tion. For example, as can been seen from Exhibit 1,
the number nine has the least chance of being the
ﬁrst digit in a discrete number stream. Intuitively,
Exhibit 1. Expected Frequency Occurrences for
Each Digit in the First and Second Places
First Digit Expected Second Digit Expected
Digit Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
0
—
11.968
1
30.103
11.389
2
17.609
10.882
3
12.494
10.433
4
9.691
10.031
5
7.918
9.668
6
6.695
9.337
7
5.799
9.035
8
5.115
8.757
9
4.576
8.500
Source: Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997)
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one would guess that all numbers would have an
equal chance of being the ﬁrst number, that is, each
would have an 11.1-percent chance of being in that
position. As unintuitive as it may seem though, per
Benford’s Law, the real probability of a ﬁrst digit
being either a one, two or a three is more than 60
percent. Exhibit 1 shows the expected occurrences
of each digit in the ﬁrst and second places.
Benford’s Law applies to many different types of
data that describe the relative sizes of similar phe
nomena, such as market values, earnings or daily
trading volumes of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) ﬁrms. As long as there are no externally
imposed constraints, such as arbitrarily imposed
maximum and/or minimum values (as would be
the case for union-based minimum hourly rates,
for example), Benford’s Law will hold true. For
example, one would expect a higher number of
ones as the ﬁrst digit than the numbers two, three,
four and so on in the population of any given city
over time.

Benford’s Law also provides the basis for digi
tal analysis of a sequence of numbers of similar
nature. For example, such analysis has been used
in a wide variety of ways to identify instances
of employee theft and tax evasion.6 In addition,
software that incorporates digital analysis based
on Benford’s Law has been adopted by many large
international audit ﬁrms. And, as discussed above,
it has proved helpful in identifying instances of
window dressing among various firms in the
United States and other countries.

Data and Methodology
The Standard & Poor ’s Research Insight database
was used to supply the primary data used in this
study. The analysis included the annual net incomes
of both active and inactive ﬁrms listed on the NYSE,
American Stock Exchange (ASE) and NASDAQ for
1950 through 2005. The ﬁnal sample consisted of
194,720 positive earnings observations.

Exhibit 2. Distributions of the Second Digits of Positive Annual Earnings by Industry Groups
Industry Group
Energy
(n = 7,899)
Construction
(n = 8,378)
Capital goods
(n = 39,308)
Transportation
(n = 7,549)
Finance
(n = 30,833)
Consumer goods
(n = 71,930)
Basic Industries
(n = 12,334)
Utilities
(n = 16,489)
Expected
proportion (%)

Second Digit
0
1
2.47 *** -0.08
6.76
0.22
2.22 *** 0.09
6.25
0.25
2.02 *** -0.02
12.36
0.12
1.73 *** -0.20
4.61
0.52
1.65 *** 0.24
8.92
1.33
1.57 *** -0.03
12.96
0.23
1.52 *** -0.06
5.20
0.20
0.68 *** 0.27
2.69
1.09
11.97
11.39

2
3
0.20
-0.09
0.54
0.24
-0.78 ** -0.05
2.29
0.13
-0.31 ** -0.13
1.98
0.83
0.00
0.15
0.00
0.41
0.17
0.02
0.92
0.09
0.10
-0.14
0.82
1.21
-0.33
0.27
1.18
0.96
-0.01
-0.38
0.02
1.60
10.88
10.43

4
5
6
7
8
9
-0.52
0.18
-0.76 ** -0.30
-0.23
-0.88 ***
1.53
0.53
2.28
0.91
0.69
2.78
-0.11
0.77 ** -0.30
-0.40
-0.39
-1.06 ***
0.32
2.39
0.93
1.24
1.24
3.47
-0.18
-0.04
-0.03
-0.21
-0.16
-0.94 ***
1.18
0.27
0.20
1.42
1.10
6.70
-0.74 ** -0.45
0.18
0.11
-0.30
-0.50
2.14
1.30
0.54
0.34
0.88
1.53
-0.27
-0.13
-0.27
-0.32 * -0.35 ** -0.75 ***
1.56
0.74
1.61
1.91
2.17
4.68
-0.23 ** -0.03
-0.11
-0.09
-0.24 ** -0.81 ***
2.05
0.26
0.96
0.81
2.27
7.75
-0.15
0.04
0.29
-0.40
-0.11
-1.09 ***
0.53
0.15
1.11
1.50
0.40
4.32
0.29
0.13
-0.30
-0.16
-0.31
-0.23
1.23
0.56
1.31
0.66
1.36
1.06
10.03
9.67
9.34
9.04
8.76
8.50

Note: The ﬁrst number in each cell of industry groups represents the percentage deviation from expected proportion. For example, for ﬁrms in the
energy industry, the expected proportion for zero in the second digit was 11.97 percent. The actual proportion was 11.97 + 2.47 = 14.44 percent.
The second number reports the Z-statistic (in italics). The expected proportion in percentage of each number (0–9) in the second place of the earn
ings is reported in the last row.
*, ** and *** are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Benford’s Law helps to predict the normal level
of number duplication in a particular set of data.
In other words, this makes it possible to identify
numbers that don’t “ﬁt” the norm that is expected.
By deﬁnition, this would include fraudulently
generated numbers by managers wishing to alter
the actual earnings ﬁgures to their own advantage.
Statistically speaking, if managers manipulate
earnings by altering the ﬁnancial numbers, then
one would expect to observe an abnormal occur
rence of certain numbers in the second position
for these disclosed ﬁgures. More speciﬁcally, there
would be more zeros and fewer nines in the second
digit position than predicted by Benford’s Law.
To test the signiﬁcance of an abnormal distribu
tion, a comparison was made of each number in the
second place of disclosed ﬁnancial ﬁgures to the
expected occurrences of those numbers as projected
by Benford’s Law. A normally distributed Z-statistic
was used to perform a signiﬁcance test of the ob
served deviations from the expected proportions.

Results
Earnings numbers for ﬁrms in eight industries were
analyzed to try to discover any evidence of window
dressing. The industry classiﬁcation was based on
one used by the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.7

Exhibit 2 presents the distributions of the second
digits for these individual industry groups. The
results are presented in descending order based
on the magnitude of deviation of zeros as the
second digit. The first number in each cell of the
industry groups represents the percentage devia
tion from the expected proportion. The second
number (in italics) reports the Z-statistic of the
deviation, or Z-score.
As expected, there were systematically more
zeros in the second place of reported earnings
across all industries. This is substantiated by the
highly significant Z-statistics generated for these
values. A highly significant Z-statistic would
indicate that the relationship being tested would
have been very unlikely to have occurred by
chance alone. The study also found that, except
for the transportation and utilities classification,
there were systematically fewer nines in the
second place of the reported earnings figures
across industries. This finding suggests that the
practice of rounding final figures on financial
statements is a fairly common practice among
firms in all industries. It could be argued that
the rounding activity is occurring because it is a
practical, common practice for most industries
when they present their final earnings figures in
the financial statements. However, to the extent
that the practice of window dressing may impair

Exhibit 3. Differences in the Observed Proportion of Zero as the Second Digit Among Industries
Industry Groups
Energy
Construction
Capital goods
Transportation
Finance
Consumer goods
Basic industries
Utilities

Energy Construction
—
0.25
—
0.45
0.20
0.74
0.49
0.82*
0.57
0.90**
0.65*
0.95*
0.70
1.79***
1.54***

Capital
Goods Transportation

—
0.29
0.37
0.45*
0.50
1.34***

—
0.08
0.16
0.21
1.05**

Finance

—
0.08
0.13
0.97***

Consumer
Basic
Goods
Industries Utilities

—
0.05
0.89***

—
0.84**

—

Note: The numerical values in the cells of this exhibit are derived from Exhibit 2. Each cell holds the difference in observed percentage
of zero as the second digit between the industry in column and the industry in row. For example, the Energy/Utilities cell value,
1.79, is the difference between the deviation of zero for ﬁrms in the energy industry (2.47 percent) and the deviation of zero for
ﬁrms in the utilities industry (0.68). It suggests that energy ﬁrms engaged more often in window dressing than utilities ﬁrms.
Z-statistic (normal distribution) is used to test the difference in the observed percentage of zero as the second digit between any
two industries.
*, ** and *** are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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the quality of earnings numbers, lenders should
represents the true underlying relationship in the
be concerned with the rationale for such practices
overall data. To examine the statistical signiﬁcance of
on the part of management. This practice could
the degree of difference in window dressing among
also be attributable to management’s incentive to
industries, an analysis was performed to address the
either change investor expectation of the firm’s
percentage deviation of zeros as the second digit of
future prospects or to meet the requirements of
earnings between industries. Exhibit 3 presents these
various debt covenants.
differences and builds on the results displayed in
The tabulated data in Exhibit 2 also show that
Exhibit 2. The analysis shows that ﬁrms in the energy
the magnitude of window dressing is not homo
industry have engaged in more pervasive window
geneous, or equally balanced, across industries.
dressing than those in ﬁnance, consumer goods,
Finding an eight or a seven in the second digit
basic industries or utilities. Firms in the construction
is contrary to what Benford’s Law would hold.
and capital goods industries also show a higher level
If this occurs, it may be an indication that earn
of window dressing than those in consumer goods
ings have been manipulated in some way, that
and utilities. The results show that ﬁrms in each of
is, window dressing may be present. Likewise,
the other industry categories tend to have engaged in
if the data follows the pattern outlined by the
substantially more window dressing than those com
law, then there should be a higher proportion of
panies in the utilities industry category. Finally, the
earnings figures that do
analysis indicates that the
not have higher numeri
utilities industry category
cal values in the second
reﬂects the lowest instance
There were systematically more zeros in of window dressing. From
position. For example,
in this study, firms in
a risk perspective then,
the second place of reported earnings
the finance and the conif the quality of earnings
across all industries.
sumer goods industries
is a factor affecting the
had a lack of eights in the
lending decisions, the
second place of earnings.
risk of ﬁrms in the energy
This would indicate that for those industries, the
industry appears to be the highest while the risk in
normal distribution, or ordering, of the digits in
utilities ﬁrms is the lowest.
the number corresponded to what was expected to
be found. The “pattern” of the individual numbers
Summary
“fits” with what Benford’s Law would predict.
To empirically test for this possibility, the devia
Firms have a tendency to window-dress their ﬁ
tion of zeros in the second place of earnings was
nancial statements by rounding up their reported
used to examine the degree of window dressing
earnings in a way that, while often immaterial in
across industries. The resultant analysis indicates
dollar amount, could signiﬁcantly affect the deci
that ﬁrms in the energy industry have engaged
sion-making processes of stakeholders. This practice
in the practice of window dressing more often
of reporting rounded earnings ﬁgures is perpetuated
than any other industry category. The study also
for a number of reasons, including the following:
shows that ﬁrms in the utilities industry appear to
Firms may believe that investors and creditors
engage least often in window dressing. The rest of
are more likely to perceive earnings figures
the industry classiﬁcations—construction, capital
as being signiﬁcantly less than numbers that
goods, transportation, ﬁnance, consumer goods
can be “managed” by an organization through
and basic industries—generated results that fell
a rounding-up process (that is, $1.99 million
between these two extremes.
rounded up to a value of $2.0 million, which is
Because this is an empirical study, the statistical
perceived as signiﬁcantly higher).
signiﬁcance of the results must also be assessed. In
Contracts between ﬁrms and stakeholders are
essence, this means that for each value generated by
likely to express earnings in round numbers.
the analysis, the research has to determine if the result
Using digital analysis based on Benford’s Law, this
is a reﬂection of mere chance or the ﬁnding actually
study investigated the rounding behavior among
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firms in various industries. The findings of the
study suggest that while the rounding behavior is
observed in all industries, the pervasiveness of such
behavior is not homogenous across industries, that
is, the extent of this behavior varies depending on
the industry classiﬁcation. The rounding behavior
tends to occur most often among ﬁrms in the energy
industry and least often among ﬁrms in the utilities
industry. Such ﬁndings have important implications
for the lending decisions made by commercial banks
that traditionally have concerns about the quality of
the borrower ’s ﬁnancial statements. With regard to
lending risks based on the accuracy of the ﬁnancials
submitted to lenders, this study indicates that utili
ties ﬁrms tend to have the lowest risk and the energy
ﬁrms tend to have the highest.
This study did not examine which earnings
components are most likely to be manipulated or
the general means employed by management to
achieve the target reported earnings. This would
be important data for lenders involved in debt covenants with ﬁrms in these industries. If management
“successfully” achieves the earnings benchmarks,
lenders should look into the most likely manipulated
accounts for evidence of whether management has
been involved in fraudulent reporting practices. Although there is little empirical evidence that window
dressing is a harmful practice, future research may
focus on the means used by management to round
earnings numbers and the effect of such behavior on
the decision making of ﬁnancial statements users.
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